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Abstract: Recent shortcomings in corporate affairs, related to the bursting of the
New Economy Bubble and the global financial crisis, have forced regulators to
strengthen current rules introducing new bans and requirements, aimed at guar-
anteeing the substantial and economic fairness of related party transactions (RPTs).
In 2010 rules regarding RPTs were completely reshaped by the Italian Regulatory
Body for the Italian Stock Exchange (CONSOBRegulation no. 17221). One of themost
important amendments regarded the change in the criteria by which RPTs are
mandatorily disclosed to investors. This change replaces a selection process
based on a qualitative with a quantitative approach, in order to reduce the sub-
jectivity of this particular evaluation. This study aims to analyze the effectiveness of
the disclosure of RPTs after the introduction of the new rules. Our results show that
although the new rules contribute to increasing the amount of information dis-
closed to investors through a higher number of documents reported by companies,
their percentage in relation to the overall amount is worryingly low.
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1 Introduction
Recent shortcomings in corporate affairs, related to the bursting of the New
Economy Bubble and the global financial crisis have led regulators to strengthen
the existing rules, introducing new bans and requirements, aimed at guarantee-
ing the substantial and economic fairness of related party transactions (RPTs).
The reforms introduced by regulators mainly focus on two areas: first the
approval processes and second increasing the level of transparency.
Considering information transparency as the basis of market credibility, the
aim of our study is to analyze the effectiveness of the approved disclosure of
the RPT through an empirical analysis of Italian listed companies.
We focus on the Italy for two main reasons: first because in 2010 the rules
governing RPTs were completely overhauled by the Italian regulatory body for
the Italian Stock Exchange (CONSOB Regulation no. 17221); and second because
Italian listed companies are strongly inter-related as in most European countries.
These relations involve intra-group entities as well as extra-group entities. In
particular, the Italian listed corporate sector features concentrated control
(Bianchi & Bianco, 2006) through opaque structures such as pyramids and the
dominance of a small number of interlinked but competitive entrepreneurs
(Assonime, 2011). Italian companies are generally characterized by the presence
of a controlling owner (Bianchi, 2010). This shows the relevance of this topic in
the Italian context because minority shareholders are exposed to a high risk of
exploitation (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2003). And, as Holderness (2009)
states, minority control is an issue that is widespread and constant the world
over, in different forms and modes.
Our study disregards the approval process and focuses on the informative
matter.
The selection of RPTs to be disclosed to the market was defined by former
regulations through qualitative criteria. (Former regulations enshrined qualita-
tive criteria to establish which RPTs were to be disclosed to the market?) The
regulator has now adopted a quantitative approach, aiming at reducing the
subjectivity of this particular evaluation. The reason for this change is that
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qualitative criteria, albeit theoretically superior, do not work properly in reality
(OECD, 2012). Despite the amendment, the OECD study criticizes the use of a
high threshold, inspired by quantitative criteria, because they “would exclude
major transactions because they may not be material to the company.”
This research aims to contribute to RPT literature by addressing the suspi-
cions of the OECD, by answering the following RQ: would the imposed thresholds
guarantee an appropriate disclosure on RPT?
In order to answer this RQ we examined the 252 Italian companies listed in
2011 (the year the new rules took effect). In 2011, these companies published 92
documents on RPTs.
Most data about RPTs, excluding banks subject to specific rules, were
collected from the financial statements, pursuant to Consob Resolution no.
15519/2006, as well as from the Notes on financial statements, required by IAS
24 to disclose details regarding related parties. The EC Regulation on the
application of International Accounting Standards (EC/1606/2002) became law
on 12 September 2002. In Italy, the IAS/IFRS system was adopted in commercial
law with Legislative Decree 38/2005. More information on our sample is pro-
vided in the following pages.
This paper provides input to legislators to fine-tune the current regulations
and should be considered as a starting point for future research.
2 Literature review of RPTs
The sequence of scandals (Enron, Arthur Andersen, WorldCom, Adelphia, Tyco
International and Parmalat) that shook up financial markets at the beginning of
the new millennium has fueled the debate on Corporate Governance (CG). To
understand its relevance, it is important to clearly establish the purpose of a
corporation. As Stout (2013a) and many others authors (Clarke, 2013; Stevelman,
2013; Weinstein, 2013) argue, the corporate form can meet the needs of many
different groups of entities. One of the most widespread theories is the max-
imization of shareholder value based on the difficult issue of resolving conflicts
between the ownership and other stakeholders. In this sense CG rules aims to
put shareholder interests before those of Directors (Agency theory) and stake-
holders. Hence RPTs can play a positive role in helping companies to acquire
their shareholder targets. This excludes their total ban (Goshen, 2003). But, at
the same time, they can be used to generate abuses against other different types
of entity involved in corporate life. RPTs can reduce asymmetric information
problems between outsider stakeholders (including investors) and corporate
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management (Gordon, Henry, & Palia, 2004), partly because of the conflict of
interest that can arise between/among shareholders.
For this reason, CG is expected to reduce the opportunistic behavior of
management, to improve the quality of corporate reporting quality, and to
increase firm performance (Bhagat & Bolton, 2008; Chen, Chen, & Wei, 2009;
Denis & McConnell, 2003). At the same time, it constrains (diminishes) the
opportunistic uses of discretionary accruals in a company’s financial statements
(Chung, Firth, & Kim, 2002; Park & Shin, 2004), inter-group borrowings
(Berkman, Cole, & Fu, 2009), and corporate fraud (Chen et al. 2009).
In the Shareholder Value Myth, Stout (2013b) shows how the traditional
managerial focus on the shareholder’s interest can be harmful to the corpora-
tion. He suggests a more long-term perspective that does not reward a small
subset of shareholders, the most shortsighted, opportunistic, undiversified, and
indifferent to ethics and others’ welfare. Furthermore, as Biondi (2005) suggests,
the accounting system can be deemed the heart of the business corporation and
can replace or complement the market price. A method based on accounting
reporting is better able to represent and control the relationship between share-
holders and the business corporation (Biondi, 2012).
Due to this, CG rules must regulate the assessment process and approval of
these RPTs and must improve the efficiency and quality of financial reporting
(Rezaee, 2004). This would limit the improper use of RPTs and foster the disclosure
of the information required to assess these transactions (Fooladi & Shukor, 2011).
As with CG, RPTs are also an issue that is strongly influenced by the type of
culture to which they are applied. Hofstede (1980) points to the large cultural
differences between countries as the reason the approaches adopted for specific
subjects can be so varied. As a consequence there are many different types of CG
models and rules. Globally, three main forms of capitalism are identifiable: Anglo-
Saxon, Teutonic and Latin. The main differences are generally produced by the
differences in culture but there are other elements that influence CG variables.
Despite the globalization process which is fostering unification of the models in
many counties, significant differences remain, i.e. the ownership structure and
corporate control. In particular, many studies focus on the relationship between
ownership structure (Jian & Tak, 2010; Kun, 2005; Munir, 2010; Zengquan, Sun, &
Wang, 2004), the role played by the stock market (Gordon et al., 2004; Lo, Wong,
& Firth, 2010; Yeh, Shu, & Su, 2012) and the quality and relevance of RPTs in
corporate life. Cernat (2004) argues that CG represents not only a crucial difference
between varieties of capitalism but is also a major factor in determining their
economic performance. Chen (2014) found that the financial crisis has triggered a
need for companies to adopt a new governance structure in order to better cope
with the challenges of the environment. Anyway, as yet, the literature on RPTs has
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not paid sufficient attention to the relationship between CG and RPT disclosure,
although the knowledge of these transactions can affect the way in which analysts
of Financial Statements assess the performance, financial position and risk and
opportunities of an entity (Corlacio & Tudor, 2011).
In the business literature two main definitions are used for RPTs (Chen-Wen
& Chinshun, 2007).
The first is that RPTs are generically defined as transactions between a
company and related entities (e.g. subsidiaries, affiliates, principal owners,
officers and directors) (FASB 1982). Young (2005) suggests a second definition
of RPTs that defines them as “transactions between a company and an insider,”
who is a person considered to be part of the company (Pan & Hsiu-Cheng, 2007).
The common element is the relationship between parties that can influence and
establish the binding conditions of the contract (implicitly or explicitly), that are
different because the parties are not independent.
One of the most influential and widespread definitions is provided by
International Accounting Standards which define RPTs as a “transfer of resources,
service or obligations between a reporting entity and a related party, regardless of
whether a price is charged” (IAS 24), andwhere “a related party is a person or entity
that is related to the entity that is preparing its financial statements” (IAS 24). Two
or more parties are considered to be related, both companies and people, when one
of them has the ability to influence the other in making operational or financial
decisions. Furthermore, International Accounting Standards state that related enti-
ties are members of the same group (which means that each parent, subsidiary and
fellow subsidiary is related to the others), including where the entity, or any
member of a group provides key management personnel services to the reporting
entity or to the parent of the reporting entity. The latter provision was added by
Annual Improvements to the IFRSs 2010–2012 Cycle, taking effect for annual
periods beginning on or after July 1, 2014. This version does not deem two entities
related simply because they have a director or key manager in common.
To sum up, RPTs can be observed through different perspectives, one that
puts the risks before the advantages produced by these transactions, and the
other which highlights their natural tendency to reduce monitoring costs and
information asymmetry.
From a theoretical perspective, RPTs are studied according to two different
perspectives:
a. conflicts of interest;
b. the efficient transaction hypothesis.
Lemmon and Lins (2003) suggest that a corporation ownership structure is what
principally determines the extent of agency problems between controlling insiders
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and outside investors. The insiders able to control corporate assets can potentially
expropriate outside investors by diverting resources for their personal use or by
committing funds to unprofitable projects that provide private benefits.
Furthermore, Grossman and Hart (1980) showed that if a corporation has a
broad shareholder base, no single shareholder has adequate incentives to monitor
management closely. In this context the transfer price could favor the controlling
or related party at the expense of minority shareholders (Johnson, La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 2000). For this reason it is important to guarantee an
adequate legal process that protects minorities and small investors. La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1998) argue that the absence of strong
legal protection and other external governance mechanisms further increases the
severity of agency problems between controlling insiders and outside investors.
Based on these assumptions, the first theory supports the idea that these
transactions represent a conflict of interest and that they conflict with company
and investor protections (Emshwiller, 2003). The conflict of interest theory
claims that RPTs may in general be the instrument of abuse relating to two
main opposing groups: ownership and control (executive directors and manage-
ment), or between majority and minority shareholders.
The first conflict is examined by Agency Theory literature (Eisenhardt, 1989;
Fama, 1980; Jensen & Meckling, 1976), which also deals with the effectiveness of
monitoring management (Fama & Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). The second conflict is
sufficiently analyzed in literature as an investor protection tool (La Porta, Lopez-
de-Silanesb, Shleifera, & Vishnyc, 2000). In particular, these transactions are
subject to moral hazard, i.e. a situation where a party has the tendency to take
risks because it is not liable for any costs incurred. Thus, RPTs can produce
benefits for the strong party (insiders) at the expense of the weak (outsider). The
reasons for this discrepancy are the lack of elements to preserve the minority’s
rights and the presence of asymmetric information (Beak, Kang, & Lee, 2006).
Some examples of this abuse could lead to a reduction in shareholder wealth
(tunneling transactions), yielding a virtual increase in the resources of the
corporation or finally towards producing misleading statements (earnings man-
agement). Furthermore, some studies (Gordon et al., 2004; Kohlbeck & Mayhew,
2005) conclude that weak CG leads to a larger number of RPTs. Several studies
have confirmed the use of earnings management by large numbers of listed
companies in order to achieve particular levels of return on equity (ROE) (Chen
& Yuan, 2004; Liu & Lu, 2007). The manipulation of the process of financial
reporting to obtain private gain may be easily placed through RPTs.
In contrast with the previous approach, the efficient transaction hypothesis
assumes that RPTs represent sound business exchanges, efficiently fulfilling the
underlying economic needs of the corporation (Pizzo, 2013). The basis of this
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theory is the reduction of transactions costs as well as the reduction of the risk
associated with these transactions.
Although the theories are opposed, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2005) suggest
that the potential benefit or detriment depends on the parties involved in the
transaction or the type of RPTs conducted.
Some studies underline a positive relation between RPTs and corporate perfor-
mance, through increasing sales or reducing transaction costs (Khanna & Palepu,
1997), whereas other studies support the evidence that there is a negative associa-
tion between RPTs and performance, with Tobin’s q and return on assets (ROA)
(Munir & Gul 2010) or ROE (Cheung, Jing, Lu, Rau, & Stouraitis, 2009). In addition,
Pozzoli and Venuti (2014) conclude that RPTs and company financial performance
(ROA) are not correlated and there is no evidence of cause and effect. Considering
Tobin’s q and the net profit after tax divided by the average shares outstanding for
the year, Wen-Yi Lin et al. (2010) claim that it is difficult, if not impossible, to
determine whether such transactions are beneficial or detrimental to organizational
performance, and this evaluation should be made case by case. This analysis is
made harder considering the difficulties in the different activities through ordinary
and anomalous transactions (Wong & Ming, 2003).
Other studies evaluate the effect produced by RPTs on the corporate value.
For instance, Kohlbeck and Mayhew (2010) found that the market assigns lower
values and subsequent returns to corporations that engage in certain type of
RPTs. Moreover, this study verified the different influence RPTs had in relation
to the type of RPT involved.
The conflicts of interest theory and the efficient transaction theory are not
necessary in opposition, because these transactions can produce benefits as well
as disadvantages. For this reason, as stated by Goshen (2003), a total ban on
self-dealing would be irreconcilable with the goal of preserving the performance
of efficient transactions. Furthermore, a non-intervention approach does not
protect the investor from the conflict of interest problem.
Finally, a contingency perspective has been suggested that encompasses
both the theories (Pizzo, 2011). The basis of this perspective is the consideration
that both of the above research methodologies have inconsistencies or deficien-
cies and are unable to cope with various kinds of possible cases.
Some studies suggest that, on average, RPTs are not harmful to outside share-
holders (Ryngaert & Shawn, 2011). This observation can be extended to the other
classes of stakeholders (Henry, Gordon, Reed, & Louwers, 2007). However, a high
inherent risk exists due to the attitude of RPT, higher than for other operations, to
engage in fraudulent behaviors. In particular this type of transaction tends to increase
the discrepancy in treatment between those who hold the power and those who can
only be subject to it (minority shareholders or shareholdings in general).
Disclosure on Related Party Transactions 7
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/29/16 6:38 PM
Most of these transactions are a normal feature of business, because many
entities frequently carry out their activities through subsidiaries, joint control or
significant influence, and the fact that corporations conduct a high volume of
such transactions should not automatically lead to the conclusion that they are
instruments used to hide accounting and financial fraud (Gordon, Henry,
Louwers, & Reed, 2007).
Although it should be remembered that the disclosure of RPTs is essential
for the proper understanding of corporate performance, it does not itself prevent
improper or illegal activities. Consequently informing stakeholders is different
from supplying a legal protection of stakeholders’ rights.
Regarding disclosure, some studies (Chalmers & Godfrey, 2004; Chalmers, 2001;
Taylor & Darus, 2006) provide evidence that the quality of voluntary derivative
disclosure by corporations gradually increased over the period leading up to the
introduction of the mandatory disclosure requirements, and, at the same time, there
was a significant increase in voluntary disclosure in the year in which the mandatory
disclosure requirements came into effect. Hwang et al. (2013) provide evidence that
disclosure regulation helps to reduce a few types of transactions (earnings manage-
ment), but this influence is non-symmetric between different sectors.
More detailed disclosure requirements limit the number of accounting
choices to managers, forcing them to disclose related party information (Leuz
& Verrecchia, 2000).
Regulators have issued rules aimed at increasing the transparency of RPTs
and reducing their tendency to generate conflicts of interest.
From a normative point of view the presence of gaps and weaknesses is evident.
Numerous studies provide evidence of their role in many financial crises (Swartz
& Watkins, 2003; Tague, 2004) and in achieving specific aims (Erickson, Mayhew, &
Felix, 2000), whilst others show that RPTs did not play a strategic role in various
corporate scandals (Bell & Carcello, 2000). While the presence of RPTs is not indica-
tive of fraudulent financial reporting, failure to recognize or disclose RPTs was found
to be one of the top 10 audit deficiencies in the United States by Beasley et al. (2001).
Regulators reacted by strengthening the existing rules introducing new bans
and requirements, aimed at guaranteeing the respect of stakeholders’ rights. For
instance, in 2002 the Sarbanes–Oxley Act set new or enhanced standards for all
US public company boards, management and public accounting corporations
with the aim of restoring public trust in the nation’s securities markets. Section
402 of the document deals with the issue of conflicts of interest and prohibited
loans to some related parties such as directors and officers.
In response to the perception that stricter financial governance laws were
needed, SOX-type laws were subsequently introduced in many other countries
such as Japan, Germany, France, Italy and Australia.
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However, these frauds can be carried out with parties not included in the
most common definitions of related parties.
As stated, the attention paid to these transactions in particular is due to
their greater inherent risk. Hence regulation cannot exclude a risk approach to
evaluating the transactions to be disclosed in order to identify a correct tradeoff
between costs and positive effects.
3 Rules on RPT disclosure
3.1 Italian rules
In Italy the legislative process has been gradual, starting with the adoption of
EU directives. Consob communiqués 93002422 in 1993, 97001574 in 1997 and
98015554 in 1998 (the latter focused on the transparency of RPTs in Financial
Statements) have played a central role.
In 2002, the regulation of RPTs was implemented with the introduction
(Resolution no. 13616) of a mandatory communication of material RPTs in a
specific document or press release.
IAS/IFRS has been applicable in Italy since 2005. IAS 24 is entitled “Related
Party Disclosures.” The disclosure of these transactions aimed at ensuring that
“Financial Statements contain the disclosures necessary to draw attention to the
possibility that the reported financial position and results may have been
affected by the existence of related parties” (IAS 24 par. 1).
Finally, another step was taken in Italy at the end of 2010. The rules on RPTs
were overhauled by the Italian regulatory body for the Italian Stock Exchange
(CONSOB Regulation no. 17221).
The full introduction of new regulations at the beginning of 2011 was the
final step of the process in order to improve the protection of minority share-
holders, initiated by the Draghi reforms of 1998 and accelerated after the Cirio1
and Parmalat2 (Ferrarini & Giudici 2005; Bava & Devalle, 2012; Melis, 2005)
scandals.
1 In 2002, the Cirio company declared default on its bonds. The default cost about 1.125 million
euros to a plethora of small investors, most of them Italian. Cirio involved a major conflict of
interest by banks and therefore a failure of board and internal oversight.
2 US SEC defines Parmalat as “one of the largest and most brazen corporate financial frauds in
history.” On December 2003, after the Bank of America had stated that Parmalat did not hold
nearly $5B in liquid assets, Parmalat filed for bankruptcy. The auditors determined that the
debts amounted to €14.3 bn euros, which was almost eight times the sum originally stated.
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The recent Italian rules on RPTs (Consob Regulation no. 17221/2010) established
twomain targets in order to promote and improve investor protection: guaranteeing
the substantial correctness of these transactions and improving transparency
This new regulatory approach establishes that RPTs need to be reviewed by
a committee of independent directors, and the procedure differentiates between
material and non-material RPTs. For material RPTs, a special procedure is
followed, involving review and disclosure. A committee of independent directors
must be involved in the negotiation of these transactions, and adequate infor-
mation must be received in order to express an opinion on fairness. After the
committee has expressed a favorable opinion, the transactions must be
approved by the board of directors.
Rules on RPTs do not only concern the implementation of specific processes
in corporations, but also accounting fulfillments, requiring new mandatory
disclosure in order to improve transparency.
In particular, this paper focuses on the rules concerning disclosure ex post
(after approval), without analyzing the entire regulation and approval process.
This study investigates whether the new rules, based on quantitative thresholds,
have increased the transparency level of RPTs, and whether this level can be
considered sufficient to inform stakeholders of RPTs.
We verified the achievement of the two targets by analysis at two levels. The
first aimed to understand whether the Consob Regulations have produced an
increase in the number of transactions disclosed to the market, and the second
to estimate whether the percentage of operations disclosed is appropriate for a
proper understanding of Financial Statements.
The main innovation introduced by Consob concerns the selection of the
RPTs to disclose. Previously qualitative criteria were used, now replaced by
quantitative criteria. In other words, Directors had previously judged when a
transaction was material, and duly disclosed it to investors. The regulator has
changed this to a quantitative approach, reducing the subjectivity of this eva-
luation because qualitative criteria, although theoretically superior, do not work
properly in reality (OECD, 2012). Today directors are obliged to apply a special
procedure involving review and ad hoc disclosure of the transactions that
exceed established thresholds. Disclosure of RPTs is graduated according to
the relevance of the transaction that is immediate, because, as the OECD states,
“it is important for the market to know whether the company is being run with
due regard to the interests of all its investors. To this end, it is essential for the
company to fully disclose material related to party transactions to the market,
either individually, or on a grouped basis, including whether they have been
executed at arms-length and on normal market terms. In a number of jurisdic-
tions this is indeed already a legal requirement” (OECD, 2004). Consequently
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two general issues arise. First, a quantitative approach based on thresholds
weighed on specific balance sheet items might not seem material for a company
(OECD, 2012). Irrelevant transactions might appear to the public as exorbitant
and nothing but the exploitation of the system. As stated by the OECD (2012), a
high threshold could exclude most RPTs from information obligations, because
they are not individually material.
An anti-elusive provision may require the disclosure of homogeneous trans-
actions entered into with the same related party which, although not individu-
ally, reach the materiality threshold when considered cumulatively. However,
such essentially arbitrary criteria carry the risk of manipulation by companies,
requiring underpinning by actions such as requiring the continuous reporting of
transactions below the limit to the regulator, in order to increase the number of
operations disclosed (Gromis di Trana, 2014).
Secondly, as noted in the Second Consultation paper on the regulation of
RPTs (April 2008), the ability of major shareholders and managements to estab-
lish what is a normal transaction might open up the opportunity for the abuse of
minority shareholders’ rights. Therefore, the new regulation excludes transac-
tions in the normal course of business: these transactions should be closely
monitored to ensure that the concept is not violated in practice.
A preliminary analysis conducted by Consob to justify normative changes
(Consob Consultation Paper on the regulation of RPTs) showed that the magnitude
of RPTs differed significantly between companies, leading Consob to amend the
qualitative definition of RPTs to be disclosed by introducing quantitative criteria:
material transactions are now identified as a result of a significance test.
Consob identified three main ratios:
I. Transaction value ratio
Transaction value
Equity ðor capitalizationÞ  5%
This ratio compares the consideration of the transactions and the book or market
values of listed companies.
II. Assets ratio
Assets of the transaction
Assets
 5%
This test regards the ratio of the assets involved in the transaction and the
company’s total assets.
III. Liabilities ratio
Liabilitiesofthetransaction
Assets
 5%
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This test regards the ratio of the liabilities of the transaction and the company’s
total assets.
This test regards the ratio of the liabilities of the transaction and the
company’s total assets.
The three-ratio system was set up in order to evaluate different types of
transactions. Commercial transactions are generally evaluated using the first
ratio, acquisitions can be evaluated with the second ratio, whereas the third
ratio is more appropriate for loans.
According to quantitative criteria, a transaction is considered material if it
exceeds one of the three thresholds. The rules fix the threshold at 5%, but
companies can set lower levels in their internal codes.
Furthermore, a reduction of these thresholds to 2.5% is applied in the case
of transactions with the parent company. In any case for some large Italian
companies the material level is estimated at several hundred million euros.
In addition, in order to increase the number of operations disclosed, an anti-
elusive provision requires the disclosure of homogeneous transactions entered
into with the same related party which, although not individually, reach the
threshold when considered cumulatively. This provision is the result of consul-
tation. The first version required the grouping of all transactions carried out with
the same entity. The new version, based on essentially arbitrary criteria, was
fiercely demanded by some organizations (Assonime, Abi, Confindustria and
Enel) and aimed at reducing the extension of the first version, carrying the risk
of manipulation by companies, requiring underpinning by actions such as
requiring the continuous reporting of transactions below the limit to the
regulator.
There are also opt-out provisions regarding transactions in the ordinary
course of business, small transactions and urgent transactions whenever the
company is facing financial distress. These transactions are not disclosed to the
markets, but if they are material they are the object of specific communication to
Consob which verifies that no abuse has taken place.
The new regulations came into force at the end of 2010.
3.2 Other countries
In order to complete our analysis it is useful to understand how RPTs have been
regulated in other countries. Specifically with regard to the approach for the
selection of transactions to disclose, this paragraph briefly summarizes other
regulations which have inspired Italian legislators or which could inspire them
in future.
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Like Asia, Anglo-Saxon countries pay particular attention to disclosure using a
quantitative approach aimed at identifying the relevant transactions to be reported.
Unlike them, the Latin (France) and German models establish the approval process
with the related internal mechanism of control first. These differences highlight the
different roles played by the stock market in each country.
In the UK, rules on RPTs are included in Listing rule 11 (“Related party
transactions”). The regulation is based on a quantitative approach. It is the
model used by Consob to reshape the Italian rules. Listing rule 11 is not applied
to small transactions (≤0.25% for each percentage ratio) and to operations
without unusual features.
Regulations concern transactions that exceed at least one of the percentage
ratios fixed by more than 5%. In this case disclosure consists of a communication
to the Regulatory Information Service (RIS) and the creation of a specific docu-
ment for the shareholders, known as a circular, where the transaction is described
in detail. In the case of transactions included between 0.25% and 5%, the rules
oblige companies to communicate to the Financial Service Authority (FSA)
by written confirmation of an independent adviser certifying that the terms of
the transaction are fair and reasonable. The approval process is based on the
circulation of a form to the shareholders before entering into material RPTs. A
review by independent financial experts is required and the majority of the
minority shareholding has to be approved.
Regarding the US system, on January 27, 2006, the SEC proposed an amend-
ment to Items 402 (executive compensation) 30, 404 (RPTs) and 407 (indepen-
dent directors) of Regulation S-K regarding disclosure. In particular, the
amendment to Item 404 “significantly modified” the disclosure requirement
for RPTs promulgated in 1982.
The American regulation for the disclosure of RPTs is included in Regulation
S-X (17 CFR 210.4–08k).
It imposes a communication on RPTs in the management report or proxy
statement for the Annual Shareholders Meeting and establishes a communica-
tions obligation for transactions made with the related person where the amount
involved exceeds 120,000 dollars. In addition, the rules are stricter for smaller
reporting companies in that mandatory disclosure applies for transactions of
amounts equal or superior to 120,000 dollars or 1% of the average value of the
net assets in the last 2 years if lower.
Companies use directors’ and officers’ questionnaires on an annual basis in
order to collect information about their family members’ affiliations with entities
that have transactions with the company.
For transactions carried out with other entities, FAS 57 states that “Financial
Statements shall include disclosures of material related party transactions, other
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than compensation arrangements, expense allowances, and other similar items
in the ordinary course of business.
The disclosure shall include:
a. The nature of the relationship(s) involved;
b. A description of the transactions, including transactions to which no
amounts or nominal amounts were ascribed, for each of the periods for
which income statements are presented, and such other information deemed
necessary for an understanding of the effects of the transactions on the
financial statements;
c. The dollar amounts of transactions for each of the periods for which income
statements are presented and the effects of any change in the method of
establishing the terms from that used in the preceding period;
d. Amounts due from or to related parties as of the date of each balance sheet
presented and, if not otherwise apparent, the terms and manner of
settlement.”
The approval process is required from an appropriate group within the company
(e.g. audit committee). This is similar to the Italian model.
In Asia, the Hong Kong Stock Exchange has clear rules governing RPTs.
Their aim is to ensure that the interests of shareholders as a whole are taken into
account.
They include a set of requirements regarding disclosure and approval
mechanisms depending on the size and significance of the transaction.
Listing rules 14A divide RPTs into three categories:
1. Small operation exempt: less than 0.01% of total assets or revenues, or less
than 2.5% of total assets and revenues and lower than HK$1,000,000
2. Operation to report and announce but not approved by a majority of the
independent shareholders: less than 2.5% of total assets or revenues, or less
than 25% of total assets and revenues and lower than HK$10,000,000
3. Operation to report and approved by a majority of the independent share-
holders: more than 2.5% or more than HK$10,000,000
The approval process is required from an independent financial advisor who
must advise an independent board committee. This committee advises share-
holders for minority approval.
The rules in Singapore are similar to those in Hong Kong and are similarly
based on a quantitative approach.
Under the Singapore Exchange Listing Manual an RPT must immediately be
reported if the value involved exceeds 3% of total assets. A transaction must
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be reported and approved if it has a value of over 5% of total assets. The
announcement must also include a statement by the Audit Committee that
attests the fairness of the operation.
In Singapore, board approval is required by the Audit Committee, and
shareholders vote on significant transactions after advice from an independent
financial adviser.
For Latin countries, the French regulation is included in the Code de
Commerce (sections L 225–38 – L 225–42) applicable only to listed companies.
This regulation does not adopt a quantitative approach but is focused on the
approval process for relevant transactions. It establishes that approval must be
given by the directors after the information has been analyzed by the chairman
and external auditor in order to produce documents for the Shareholders
Meeting.
In France the board of directors must notify the auditors of RPTs approved,
and the auditors prepare the list of RPTs made for ex-post authorization by
shareholders.
The German Corporate Governance Code includes mandatory disclosure for
directors (management board) addressed to the supervisory board in case of a
conflict of interests. Specific obligations of disclosure for transactions between
the company and its shareholders are not included. Only group regulations
include the requirement to include details of intragroup transactions in the
Management Report.
Neither board nor shareholder approval is required.
Table 1 shows the different approaches adopted by various countries to
define relevant transactions.
Table 1: RPT approach in other countries.
Country Quantitative
approach
Material transactions
UK Yes Transactions that exceed at least one of the percentage ratios
fixed for more than %
USA Yes Transactions made with the related person where the amount
involved exceeds , dollars and other material
transactions carried out with related entities
Hong Kong Yes Operation to report and approve: more than .% or more than
HK$,,, whichever is the lowest
Singapore Yes Transaction that has a value superior to % of the total assets
France No Qualitative approach
Germany No Qualitative approach
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4 Research questions and samples
Our analysis aims primarily to verify whether the new rules have increased trans-
parency and whether the magnitude of the RPTs disclosed, selected through the
new Consob ratios, is deemed acceptable for the stakeholder. The introduction of
quantitative criteria aims to reduce subjectivity in the selection process of the RPTs
to disclose, but it does not set a low limit of magnitude in the disclosing process.
Our RQs are:
RQ 1) Have Consob Regulations increased the number of RPTs disclosed to
markets?
The reference population comprises 2,524 companies/year in the period between
2003 and 2012.
The subject of this analysis is the specific documentation that companies are
obliged to publish when they carry out material RPTs. A total of 366 communica-
tions were made over this period, obtained by analyzing the companies’ websites
and checking them against the Annual Consob Report (showing the number of
transactions disclosed). The data were analyzed using descriptive statistics.
A preliminary Consob analysis covering the period between 2003 and 2007
(Consob Consultation Paper on the regulation of RPTs, April 2008) aimed at
justifying the regulatory changes was also examined. In particular, the evidence
produced in the last few years is compared with the Consob results in order to
reveal any differences between these two periods.
RQ 2) Would the imposed thresholds guarantee appropriate RPT disclosure?
As implied by the OECD, the use of a high threshold, inspired by quantitative
criteria, “would exclude major transactions because they may not be material to
the company.”
Our sample is restricted to 2011, when the Italian regulation came into force.
Forty-three Italian listed companies published at least one disclosing document
on RPTs in 2011 (a total of 92 documents), some operating in the financial sector.
Our sample includes all the non-financial companies and a total of 30 compa-
nies (69.7%) and 46 documents (50%).
In order to estimate the economic effects of disclosed RPTs on the economic
effects of executed RPTs during the sample year, a great deal of data needs to be
collected (see Appendix for further details).
There are many sources of information on RPTs, with varying content. The
information reported in financial statements was analyzed in compliance with
Consob Resolution 15519/2006, which obliges companies to itemize the amount
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of RPTs for each line of the financial and income statement. This type of
disclosure applies to separate as well as Consolidated Financial Statements.
The total amount of related revenues and costs was obtained from this provi-
sion. This information is only quantitative and it shows the extent to which RPTs
influence economic and financial results. This source is useful to understand the
weight of related parties on the business. Investors are unable to understand the
transactions, but can see their effects on the balance sheet.
Additional information on material RPTs is disclosed in specific documents
as required by art. 5 of Consob Regulations 17721. As previously illustrated, the
total amount of related revenues and costs disclosed to the market was obtained
from this source. In particular, we assessed the effect produced by each transac-
tion on 2011 company Income Statements. This is the sole instrument informing
investors in “real time.” Others sources are temporary and deferred to the
balance sheet date. This type of disclosure informs investors who are able to
react to directors’ actions.
Other sources were considered for dual control purposes, such as the
information required by International Accounting Standards (IAS 24).
Companies must provide details of the most significant transactions with quali-
tative (nature of the relationship) and quantitative information (amount and
effect produced), or through disclosures made in Management Reports and
Interim Management Reports regarding material RPTs, RPTs identified by sec-
tion 2427, paragraph 1, subsection 22-bis of the Italian Civil Code, and the
modification or evolution of RPTs already started and producing material effects
on the business results must be listed. These channels are useful to gather
information on material transactions together, but the timing of these types of
disclosure depends on balance sheets’ dates.
5 Results
5.1 Transparency level
One of the main aims of Consob Regulation 17221 is to increase the transparency
level of RPTs.
We propose a quantitative analysis inspired by a preliminary study con-
ducted by Consob aimed at legitimizing legal amendments. These observations
are based on the number of documents on RPTs published before and after the
application of the new rules. The results give an idea of the success or failure of
the modification.
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In order to examine the changes produced by Consob Regulations two main
periods need to be distinguished: pre- and post-reform. For our purposes, years
2003–2010 are “pre-reform” and the years from 2011 to 2012 are “post-reform”
for a gross amount of 366 documents.
Furthermore, the “pre-reform” period can be divided into two parts: the first
from 2003 to 2007 (ante-Crisis period) and the second from 2008 to 2010
(Starting Crisis period). By Crisis, we mean the events and conditions (subprime
mortgage crisis and Lehman Brothers) which led to a financial crisis and sub-
sequent recession beginning in 2008. Table 2 summarizes the results of the
analysis, showing the number of communications produced in these years
(press releases and informative documents).
Before the reform there were two alternative means to disclose RPTs: via a press
release or informative document. The option of the press release was abolished
by Consob Regulations making the specific document the sole instrument for the
disclosure of material RPTs. The legislator has fixed the minimal contents
directors must disclose and explain in the document, in order to reduce discre-
tionary contents and give proper emphasis to the transaction.
Table 2 shows that on average 29 documents per year were published with a
total of 286 documents. Including press releases the average is 37 out of a total
of 366. From 2003 to 2010, 110 RPTs were disclosed (190 including both options),
14 documents per year. After the reform, 176.92 RPTs were disclosed in 2011 and
84 in 2012. This substantial increase is partly due to the use of the quantitative
instead of the qualitative method.
Table 2: Disclosure of RPTs (2003–2012).
Year Press
release
Informative
document
Total No.
companies
No. listed
companies
Commun. on listed
companies
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
      .
 –     .
 –     .
Tot.   
Avg.   
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Tables 2 and 3 show that the regulations appear to have improved disclosure.
This is confirmed by the ratios of communications to the number of listed
companies and by the increased percentage of communicating companies out
of the total number of listed companies. Results show that after 2011 the
percentage is twice what it was before. At the same time there is also a greater
tendency for communicating companies to disclose more than one transaction.
Table 4 analyzes the relationship between the reporting entity and the
related party with which the transaction is made, in the 2003–2007 period
(Consob report) and 2011–2012 period (our analysis).
Table 4 shows that in the pre-Crisis period (2003–2007) half of the RPTs dis-
closed (47.62%) involved subsidiaries. Parent companies were involved in
22.63%, 14.29% directors, 5.95% were carried out with associates and 9.52%
with companies subject to common control.
In the post-reform period the trend seems to be inverted. The main parties
involved are parent companies (39.77%). Only 23.8% of those involved are sub-
sidiaries. There has been an increase in RPTs made with companies subject to
common control. The associate percentages are similar in the two periods analyzed.
Table 5 shows that in the pre-Crisis period (2003–2007) the majority (75%) of
RPTs disclosed were sales and purchases, loans were less than 10% and mergers
and divisions accounted for only 8%.
Table 4: Type of party engaged in the transaction.
Type of party – –
Parent company .% .%
Director .% .%
Companies subject to common control .% .%
Associate .% .%
Subsidiary .% .%
Tot. .% .%
Table 3: Relation between number of communications, number of communicating companies
and number of listed companies.
         
Comm./Communic. comp . . .  . . . . . .
Communic. Comp/
listed comp.
. . . . . . . . . .
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Post reform (2011–2012), the most frequently disclosed RPTs were loans (41%),
followed by acquisitions and transfers, at 22%. Regarding classified RPTs in the
post-reform period, it was necessary to identify a residual class (other) that was
not taken into account in the Consob study because new regulations extended
materiality evaluation to other types of transactions not previously considered
(cash pooling, SWAP, risk transfers).
This analysis is suggested by the difference in the number of communica-
tions made between the pre-Crisis period and the Starting Crisis period. In the
first 5 years (2003–2007) the average is 17 communications per year against 35
from 2008 to 2010. This increase is interesting considering that from 2003 to
2010 there were no regulatory changes (so with nil effect), but the period after
2008 was notoriously characterized by growing instability.
Table 6 presents-cross analysis.
Table 6 shows that the majority of transactions involved loans and parent
companies. In one case a company disclosed information of an unrelated
transaction due to the imminence of the relation.
Table 5: Type of transactions.
Type of transaction – –
Sales and purchases .% .%
Other .% .%
Mergers and spins-off .% .%
Loans .% .%
Equity transaction .% .%
Tot. .% .%
Table 6: Cross-analysis of party and transaction type (post reform 2011–2012).
Directors Parent
company
Associate Common
control
Subsidiary No related? Tot.
Sales and
purchases
     – 
Other       
Merg. and
spins-off
–     – 
Loans      – 
Equity
transaction
     – 
Tot.       
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5.2 Magnitude of RPTs disclosed
Our analysis was based solely on listed commercial and industrial companies,
observing only the effects produced by RPTs on Income Statements.
The selection of companies per sector reduced our sample to 30 companies
(see Appendix) and 46 documents published. This is because banks differ in
their approach to RPTs and are subject to other regulations.
After selecting the companies, analysis was carried out by considering solely
the economic effect of RPTs due to operational concerns making the impact of
RPTs on the Income Statement easier to calculate. In fact, Income Statement
items are reset every year, removing the restrictions produced by a lack of
information traceable to Financial Statements.
As for every other business operation, RPTs produce economic and/or finan-
cial effects. These effects may be separate or combined in the same transactions.
This analysis considers solely the impact of RPTs on the Income Statement,
hence evaluating only the economic effect produced. But comparisons are made
simultaneously, distinguishing between revenues (positive items on the Income
Statement) and costs (negative items on the Income Statement). The reason for
this choice is that using solely net income (difference between earnings and
costs) does not enable the proper estimation of RPT impacts due to algebraic
compensation.
5.2.1 Step 1: impact of RPTs on income statements
First of all, the total effect of RPTs made during the year was compared with the
total amount of revenues or costs.
The total amount of revenues and costs collected in our sample is shown in
Table 8 in thousands of euros, the sum of all positive items (for revenues) or
negative items (for costs), excluding tax, in 2011 Income Statements.
The ratio used is:
Weight of RPTs in the Income Statement
Amount of economic effect produced by RPTs
Total amount of revenues or costsð Þ ¼ xx% ½1
Related values are the sum of all revenues and costs made with related parties.
These amounts are shown in Financial Statements, in compliance with Consob
Resolution 15519/2006. Companies are obliged to itemize the amounts of reven-
ues and costs produced with RPTs in separate and Consolidated Income
Statements. More details are provided in Appendix.
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A simple comparison between total and related revenues (absolute value com-
parison) does not produce correct results because of the variation in the size of
the companies considered (Table 7). The comparison has therefore been
adjusted calculating the mean of the percentage for every observation.3
Table 8 presents the distribution of the percentage of related revenues and
costs out of the total.
Table 7 shows that total revenues are higher than total costs, but this is not
reproduced for related income components. The amount of related costs is
higher than related revenues. The rough percentage of related revenues out of
the total shows that only 6% of all transactions are carried out with related
parties, whereas the adjusted value is 16.99%, because of the average weighting
of related out of total revenues. The rough percentage of related costs out of the
total shows that 7.32% of all transactions are carried out with related parties.
The adjusted value for costs is 8.58%. Differences emerge between the percen-
tage and adjusted percentage for the costs, due to the asymmetry of the devia-
tion standard calculated solely on the percentage. For instance, in 8 out of 30
Table 7: Total revenues and costs and total related revenues and costs (thousands of euros).
Total Related % % adjusted Std. dev.
Revenues ,, ,, .% .% .
Costs ,, ,, .% .% .
Table 8: Descriptive statistics of related revenues and costs on the total.
Revenues Costs
Mean .% .%
Min. .% .%
 .% .%
 .% .%
 .% .%
Max. .% .%
3 An example is provided in Table 9: In the example, the weight of related revenues on total
revenues is 11% (473,851/4,312,349), whereas the adjusted percentage is 21% (the mean of the
percentages 8%, 18%, 37%).
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companies the related revenues are over 25%, against only 1 case (out of 30)
where related costs are over 25% of the total.
5.2.2 Step 2: the impact of RPTs disclosed on RPTs made
In order to evaluate the level of transparency and its adequacy, a comparison
must be made between the amount of RPTs disclosed and RPTs carried out,
because only some are disclosed.
In fact, transparency cannot be evaluated solely by observing the number of
RPTs disclosed; it is also important to assess the magnitude of transactions
disclosed to the stakeholders out of the total. The ratio used is:
Effects disclosed on the total
Amount economic effects produced by RPTs discolosed
Total amonut of economic effects produced by RPTs
¼ xx% ½2
This ratio is applied keeping revenues separate from costs.
Table 8 shows the total amount of related revenues and costs and the sum of
all positive (for revenues) or negative effects (for costs) produced by RPTs
disclosed in specific documents in 2011 Income Statements in thousands of
euros. The amounts of disclosed revenues and costs are calculated analyzing
the 46 specific documents for material RPTs published in 2011 (required by
Consob Regulation 17721). For each we have identified and assessed solely the
economic effect on the 2011 Income Statement.
Table 10 shows worrying results. The total revenues disclosed are consid-
erably higher than the total costs disclosed (882%), which may suggest a
dangerous tendency to limit negative news to investors. Furthermore, it is
interesting to consider that the amount of the related costs is higher than the
related revenues.
The rough percentage of disclosed revenues out of the total of related
revenues suggests that only 9.37% are disclosed to markets. The adjusted result
Table 9: Example.
Company Total revenues Related revenuse %
A ,, , %
B , , %
C , , %
Tot. ,, , %
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is 4.92%, due to the average weighting of related revenues in the total. Only
1.91% of related costs are disclosed.
Analysis shows that 95% of revenues and 98% of costs made with related
parties are not subject to disclosure.
Table 11 shows the distribution of the percentage of related revenues and
costs disclosed out of the total related amount.
The reason for these disclosure inefficiencies are that the quantitative ratios
applied to identify material transactions are weighted on the basis of the
dimensions of the Financial Statement (total assets or equity) or market value
(capitalization), and disregard the dimensions of the Income Statement.
Alternatively, observing the same problem from a different point of view, the
quantitative thresholds applied are too high to identify material transactions
producing effects on Income Statements.
At the same time the lack of clear rules about gathering similar transactions
together may lead companies to split large into smaller transactions, reducing
the cost of disclosure and other fulfillments.
Our calculations are all made using information which has been made
public but, as previously explained, only some of this information is useful for
Table 11: Descriptive statistics of related revenues and costs disclosed out of
the total related amount.
Revenues Costs
Mean ,% .%
Min. .% .%
 .% .%
 .% .%
 .% .%
Max. .% .%
Table 10: Total related revenues and costs and total disclosed revenues and costs (thousands
of euros).
Related Disclosed % % adjusted
disclosed
% adjusted
undisclosed
Revenues ,, , .% .% .%
Costs ,, , .% .% .%
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investors to understand directors’ actions and, furthermore, only a part of this
information is disclosed in time to influence investor decisions.
6 Conclusions
As suggested in the literature, RPTs may be instruments to carry out abuse
concerning conflicts of interest between ownership and control or between
majority and minority shareholders. These transactions are subject to moral
hazards, and for this reason are characterized by a greater inherent risk than
other transactions.
Regulators have recently strengthened existing rules introducing new bans
and requirements, aimed at guaranteeing the substantial and economic fairness
of these transactions.
Rules on RPTs were overhauled by the Italian regulatory body for the Italian
Stock Exchange (CONSOB Regulation 17221) in 2010. Regarding disclosure, the
main change was in the selection criteria for the transaction to be disclosed.
Regulation changed from a qualitative to a quantitative criterion in order to
reduce the subjectivity of the selection process of the RPTs to disclose.
Hence this research investigated the effect produced by the new rules on the
disclosure to market of RPTs.
Our analysis focuses first on verifying whether the new rules have increased
transparency, and second on whether the magnitude of RPTs disclosed, selected
through the new Consob ratios, guarantees acceptable information for
stakeholders.
In terms of increased transparency, our results show that the new rules have
contributed to increasing the amount of information to the market through a
higher number of documents reported by companies.
The evidence produced highlights that new regulations have increased the
quantity of information disclosed to the market, but the percentage of their
magnitude on the gross amount is worryingly low. Our study confirms OECD
suspicions that, as a consequence of the adoption of the quantitative threshold,
major transactions involving RPTs are not disclosed.
This study provides input to legislators to refine the current regulations and
is a starting point for future research, which could extend our analysis (which
deals only with economic effects) to include financial effects, or to compare the
magnitude of RPTs before and after new regulations. Furthermore, at the
moment, information on RPTs is provided by various sometimes disconnected
sources. Law-makers could oblige companies to consolidate these sources or
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create a platform where all this information is consolidated by a third party (if
not the regulatory body itself).
Appendix
Company No.
doc.
Type of transaction Revenues
(mill.)
Related
revenues
(mill.)
Related
revenues
disclosed
(mill.)
 Acea  Extension of a commercial
contract, JV dismissal
,  
 Acegas  Commercial contract   
 Arena  Equity transaction, investment
agreement, guarantees on
corporation
restructuration
 – –
 Borgosesia  Asset transfer   
 Emak  Stock acquisition   –
 ERG Renew  Financial support  . –
 Ergycapital  Contract of guarantee  . –
 Fidia  Equity transaction  – –
 FNM  JV   
 Gas Plus  Financial support  – –
 Greenvision  Stock acquisition, commercial
contract, payment agreement
  
 IGD  Asset acquisition   
 Kerself  Equity transaction, equity
transaction, commercial contract
  
 Krenergy  Equity transaction, equity
transaction
  –
 Le Buone
società
 Stock transfer – – –
 Meridiana  Equity transaction, patronage,
financial integration
  –
 Meridiana
fly
 Patronage, commercial contract,
financial integration, financial
integration, equity transaction
  –
(continued )
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Company No.
doc.
Type of transaction Costs
(mill.)
Related
costs
(mill.)
Related
costs
disclosed
(mill.)
 Acea  Extension of a commercial contract,
JV dismissal
,  –
 Acegas  Commercial contract   –
 Arena  Equity transaction, investment
agreement, guarantees on corporate
restructuring
  –
 Borgosesia  Asset transfer   –
 Emak  Stock acquisition   –
 ERG Renew  Financial support   –
(continued )
(Continued )
Company No.
doc.
Type of transaction Revenues
(mill.)
Related
revenues
(mill.)
Related
revenues
disclosed
(mill.)
 Meridie  Contract modification  – –
 Mittel  Stock transfer and acquisition   –
 Mondo TV  Equity transaction  – –
 Parmalat  Cash pooling ,  –
 Pierrel  Financial support  – –
 Pirelli  Financial support ,  
 Poligrafici  Financial support   –
 Prelios  Financial support   –
 RDB  Equity transaction, stock transfer
and acquisition
  –
 Risanamento  Credit line   –
 Safilo  Financial support ,  –
 Telecom
media
 Credit line, financial support   
 Tesmec  Leasing contract   
Total 
Disclosure on Related Party Transactions 27
Unauthenticated
Download Date | 6/29/16 6:38 PM
(Continued )
Company No.
doc.
Type of transaction Costs
(mill.)
Related
costs
(mill.)
Related
costs
disclosed
(mill.)
 Ergycapital  Contract of guarantee   –
 Fidia  Equity transaction   –
 FNM  JV   –
 Gas Plus  Financial support   –
 Greenvision  Stock acquisition, commercial
contract, payment agreement
  –
 IGD  Asset acquisition   –
 Kerself  Equity transaction, equity
transaction, commercial contract
  
 Krenergy  Equity transaction, equity transaction   –
 Le Buone
società
 Stock transfer  – –
 Meridiana  Equity transaction, patronage,
financial integration
  –
 Meridiana
fly
 Patronage, commercial contract,
financial integration, financial
integration, equity transaction
  –
 Meridie  Contract modification   
 Mittel  Stock transfer and acquisition   –
 Mondo TV  Equity transaction   –
 Parmalat  Cash pooling ,  –
 Pierrel  Financial support  – –
 Pirelli  Financial support ,  –
 Poligrafici  Financial support   –
 Prelios  Financial support   
 RDB  Equity transaction, stock transfer and
acquisition
  –
 Risanamento  Credit line   –
 Safilo  Financial support ,  –
 Telecom
media
 Credit line, financial support   –
 Tesmec  Leasing contract   –
Total 
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